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Offensive Use of the Insanity Defense:
Imposing the Insanity Defense Over the
Defendant's Objection
By DAVID S. COHN*
Introduction
Whether a trial judge' should be permitted to interpose an insanity
defense2 over the objection of a criminal defendant who is competent to
stand trial3 must be considered in light of two competing interests. On
one hand, society has a legitimate interest in refusing to punish those
whom it considers morally blameless by virtue of mental illness.' On the
other hand, a defendant may have sound, pragmatic reasons for choosing
to forego an insanity defense.' First, he may believe he is truly innocent
* B.F.A., United States International University, 1974; J.D., University of San Diego,
1987. Mr. Cohn is an associate with Dorazio, Barnhorst & Bonar in San Diego, California.
1. In an attempt to balance simplicity and gender equality, this Article uses the pronoun
"she" to refer to hypothetical trial judges and the pronoun "he" to refer to hypothetical crimi-
nal defendants.
2. For an overview of the different legal tests for insanity used in various American
jurisdictions, see S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 707 & Table 12.5 at 769-73 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter S.
BRAKEL] .
3. The legal standards employed to determine whether a criminal defendant is competent
to stand trial differ substantially from the standards employed to determine whether he should
be absolved of criminal responsibility. "In all jurisdictions, a criminal defendant is deemed
incompetent to stand trial if mental illness renders him incapable of understanding the pro-
ceedings against him or assisting in his defense." Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand
Trial, 32 UCLA L. REv. 921, 923 (1985). This test for competency focuses only on the de-
fendant's condition at the time of trial, whereas the various tests for insanity focus only on his
condition at the time of the alleged offense. See infra notes 62 & 65-66 and accompanying text.
4. In Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945), the court ex-
plained: "To punish a man who lacks the power to reason is as undignified and unworthy as
punishing an inanimate object or an animal. A man who cannot reason cannot be subject to
blame. Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame."
See also S. BRAKEL, supra note 2, at 693.
5. For a consideration of the practical and ethical difficulties confronting defense counsel
when the trial judge imposes the defense, see Note, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Insanity De-
fense-In Determining Whether To Raise the Defense of Insanity Sua Sponte Over the Objection
of a Certified Competent Defendant, the Trial Court Must Hear Evidence Supporting as Well as
Opposing the Raising of the Defense and Must Articulate the Reasons Underlying Its Ultimate
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and entitled to an unqualified acquittal. 6 Second, he may prefer to risk
imprisonment for a definite duration than to risk hospitalization for an
indefinite duration.7 Third, he may wish to avoid the stigma of mental
illness and the risk of future discrimination.8 Finally, he may view his
crime as a political statement which a determination of insanity would
denigrate.9
Beyond these practical considerations, however, a defendant has a
fundamental interest in selecting personally each defense he wishes to
marshall against the state's accusations, even if his selections are foolish
Determination. United States v. Robertson, 507 F2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1974), 53 TEx. L. REV.
1065 (1975).
6. In most American jurisdictions, a defendant who raises the insanity defense admits he
committed the actus reus-the physical act of the offense. However, he asserts he is free of
moral blame due to his mental illness. S. BRAKEL, supra note 2, at 719. In at least three
jurisdictions, however, the defendant simultaneously can plead "not guilty" and "not guilty by
reason of insanity." See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016 (West 1985); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 650 (West 1983); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 40(1) (Supp. 1986); see also
infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
7. The state often hospitalizes persons found not guilty by reason of insanity far longer
than their civil patient counterparts. German & Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitaliza-
tion of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1011, 1037 (1976). The
duration of hospitalization is "more likely to be related to the seriousness of the criminal act
than to the patient's improvement within the hospital." Id. See also Morris, The Confusion of
Confinement Syndrome Extended: The Treatment of Mentally Ill "Non-Criminal Criminals" in
New York, 18 BUFFALO L. REv. 393, 394 (1969). More important, the hospitalization period
is often longer than a criminal sentence. See Overholser, Criminal Responsibility: A Psychia-
trist's Viewpoint, 48 A.B.A. J. 527, 531 (1962); S. RUBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL LAW,
ILLUSIONS, FICTIONS, AND MYTHS 46-51 (1965).
Although release of insanity acquittees is far more liberal today than in the past, the
acquittees may still be subject to more burdensome release procedures than are involuntary
civil patients. See S. BRAKEL, supra note 2, at 725. For example, in some jurisdictions, acquit-
ted patients cannot avail themselves of administrative release procedures but must petition the
court. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 579 F.2d 324, 333-34 (5th Cir. 1978) (trial judge can refuse to
follow administrator's release recommendation); United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178, 186
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977) (district court must make final decision on
release). The United States Supreme Court has approved this differential treatment. Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
8. See Comment, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1200 (1974). In addition to social stigma, the patient may even suffer
various legal deprivations resulting from being adjudged mentally ill. See, e.g., In re Eugene
W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 623, 105 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1972) (loss of child custody); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 677.225(I)(a) (1983) (automatic suspension of the right to practice medicine); see also
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 626-27 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (persons confined to mental institutions are stigmatized as sick and abnormal both while
confined and sometimes after release).
9. See, for example, United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148, 1158 (D.D.C. 1974), in
which the defendant, a black man, attempted to kill a white man without apparent provoca-
tion, other than the fact that the victim was white. Despite evidence of mental illness, Robert-
son shunned the insanity defense because he believed it would undermine the credibility of his
racial and political views. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
INSANITY DEFENSE
or disastrous. This interest is grounded both in the defendant's personal
independence and in the very nature of our criminal justice system,1" an
adversarial process that depends upon a defendant's autonomy.
This Article analyzes the competing interests of society and the
criminal defendant in the context of two conflicting lines of case law.
The first line permits the trial judge to impose the insanity defense on an
unwilling defendant if "there is sufficient question as to... [the] defend-
ant's mental responsibility at the time of the crime. . . ."" The second
line prohibits the trial judge from interfering with a defendant's "intelli-
gent and voluntary decision"1 2 to waive the defense.
This Article concludes that the second view is not only preferable,
but also is constitutionally required. Subject to the traditional limitation
that waivers be intelligent and voluntary,13 a competent defendant may
waive a viable insanity defense just as he may enter a guilty plea14 or
waive his constitutional right to counsel.' 5 This right to select one's de-
fenses personally is not directly protected by any specific constitutional
guarantee. It is, however, a fundamental and inherent right, implicit in
the Anglo-American concept of criminal justice as embodied generally in
the Bill of Rights.' 6 Accordingly, courts should prohibit trial judges
from substituting their judgment for the judgment of competent defend-
ants on this issue, unless a defendant's competence is so marginal that his
waiver of the insanity defense cannot be considered intelligent and
voluntary.
I. Imposition of the Insanity Defense
A. Overview of the District of Columbia Cases
The two conflicting lines of case law have both developed in the
10. See infra notes 103-130 and accompanying text.
11. Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 382
U.S. 862 (1965).
12. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 367 (D.C. 1979).
13. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938) (waiver of right to counsel); Reyes v. Edmonds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1223 (D. Minn.
1979) (consent to police search).
14. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970), the Court held that a trial judge
does not commit constitutional error by accepting the guilty plea of a defendant who proclaims
his innocence. The Court explained, however, that its holding did not mean that the defendant
has an absolute constitutional right to have his plea accepted.
15. In contrast to the qualified holding in Alford, the Court held in Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975), that a criminal defendant has an absolute right under the Sixth Amend-
ment to waive his right to counsel and represent himself. See infra notes 53-54 & 109-112 and
accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 103-130 and accompanying text.
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District of Columbia.17 The District of Columbia Circuit (which in-
cludes the United States District Court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia) has adopted the first view,18 per-
mitting imposition of the defense. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, 9 however, has adopted the second view,20 prohibiting imposi-
tion of the defense. This Article criticizes the approach developed in the
District of Columbia Circuit Courts (the Whalem view)21 and supports
and expands upon the approach developed in the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals (the Frendak view).2"
1. The Whalem View
The District of Columbia Circuit's first important case in this area
was Overholser v. Lynch. 23 The trial judge in Lynch imposed the insanity
defense over the defendant's objection, acquitted him on insanity
grounds, and committed him to a psychiatric hospital pursuant to the
District's mandatory commitment statute.24 In a subsequent habeas
corpus proceeding, the United States Court of Appeals upheld the com-
17. Because these decisions are representative of decisions in other jurisdictions, this Arti-
cle largely restricts its analysis to the views set forth in the District of Columbia cases and in
relevant United States Supreme Court cases.
18. The Whalem view, supra note 11.
19. Under the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to 11-
2504 (1981)), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has authority analogous to that of a
state supreme court. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-721 (1981). Accordingly, the decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia (which together constitute the regular federal court
system for the District) do not bind the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See Bethea v.
United States, 365 A.2d 64, 70-71 & n.12 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977) (deci-
sions prior to Reform Act are binding but decisions subsequent thereto are not); M.A.P. v.
Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312-13 (D.C. 1971) (court is not bound by decisions rendered after the
Reform Act though those decisions are entitled to "great respect").
20. The Frendak view, supra note 12.
21. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
23. 288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom Lynch v. Overholser,
369 U.S. 705 (1962). In Lynch, the defendant was charged with two violations of the District's
"bad check law." Id. at 390. The trial judge ordered a mental evaluation, and the defendant
was found incompetent to stand trial. Later, the hospital issued a report stating that the de-
fendant suffered from a manic depressive psychosis which affected his financial judgment, but
that he had improved and was competent. Id.
24. Id. When Lynch was decided, the mandatory commitment statute, D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 24-301(d) (1967), provided that any defendant tried and acquitted solely on the ground that
he was insane must be confined in a mental hospital. The statute was amended in 1970, follow-
ing Lynch, to apply only to defendants who raise the defense of insanity and are acquitted.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (1981). See infra note 28.
INSANITY DEFENSE
mitment. 25  The court held that a defendant does not have absolute dis-
cretion to waive the insanity defense because society has no interest in
punishing those who are not responsible for their acts. 26 The United
States Supreme Court reversed,27 but based its decision exclusively on its
interpretation of the mandatory commitment statute. The Court held
that the statute did not apply to a defendant who had not raised the
insanity defense.28 Therefore the Court did not specifically address
whether a trial judge could impose the defense on an unwilling defend-
ant. One commentator has suggested, however, that the Court impliedly
approved the practice.29
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit next decided the seminal case of Whalem v. United States.3" As-
serting society's interest in punishing only morally culpable individuals,
the court in Whalem held that trial judges have discretion to raise the
defense over the defendant's objection:31
25. 288 F.2d at 394.
26. Id. at 393.
27. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 720 (1962).
28. The Court explained: "We find it unnecessary to consider [the] constitutional claims
... since we read [the mandatory commitment statute] as applicable only to a defendant
acquitted on the ground of insanity who has affirmatively relied upon a defense of insanity
... ." Id. at 709-10. The Court suggested that a different construction might render the
statute unconstitutional. Id. at 711.
By reversing the automatic commitment, the Court ultimately did not aid Mr. Lynch in
his release. After the Court's decision, the prosecutor indicated that he would proceed with a
civil commitment. Mr. Lynch then threw himself under the wheels of a slow-moving truck on
the grounds of St. Elizabeth's Hospital. Arens, Due Process and the Rights of the Mentally 111:
The Strange Case of Frederick Lynch, 13 CATHOLIC U.L. RPv. 3, 37-38 n.126 (1964) (Mr.
Arens was counsel for Mr. Lynch).
The current statute, D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (1981), was amended in 1970 to com-
ply with the holding in Lynch. See supra note 24. H.R. Rep. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 74
(1970) states: "In accordance with Lynch v. Overholser, this automatic commitment applies
only when the defendant himself has raised the defense of insanity. It does not apply when the
court itself raises the defense.... ." See also United States v. Henry, 600 F.2d 924, 927 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); United States v. Wright, 511 F.2d 1311, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
29. Singer, The Imposition of the Insanity Defense on an Unwilling Defendant, 41 OHIO
ST. L.J. 637, 645 (1980): "The Court did not comment on the question whether a trial judge
may impose the insanity defense on an unwilling defendant, since it disposed of the case on the
automatic commitment grounds. By implication, however, it can be argued that it sanctioned
the practice."
30. 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965). In
Whalem, the state convicted the defendant of robbery and attempted rape. Id. at 813. The
defendant then challenged the sufficiency of evidence of his identification before a three-judge
panel of the Court of Appeals. Before reaching a decision, the full court, sua sponte, ordered a
rehearing en banc to consider whether the trial judge erred by not raising the insanity issue sua
sponte despite the defendant's wishes to the contrary. Id.
31. Id. at 818-19. See Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 373 n.13 (D.C. 1979), in
which the court noted: "It appears that only a few jurisdictions have considered the issue.
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[A] defendant may not keep the issue of insanity out of the case
altogether. He may, if he wishes, refuse to raise the issue of in-
While most of the courts have accorded trial judges the discretion to impose an insanity de-
fense on the accused [the Whalem view], they generally have not explained the rationale be-
hind the decision, and by and large, their decisions are not very helpful."
Courts permitting the trial court to exercise such discretion, or recognizing in dicta the
propriety of such discretion, include the following: Les v. Meredeth, 193 Colo. 3, 6, 561 P.2d
1256, 1259 (1977) (en banc) (holding that the trial judge may enter an insanity plea irrespec-
tive of the defendant's wishes to the contrary), but see Boyd v. People, 108 Colo. 289, 294, 116
P.2d 193, 194-95 (1941) (an opinion to the contrary, distinguished in Les because Boyd was
decided under an earlier statute that did not specifically authorize the trial judge to interpose
the defense sua sponte); State v. Fernald, 248 A.2d 754, 760-61 (Me. 1968) (upholding the trial
judge's refusal to allow the defendant to withdraw an insanity plea); Walker v. State, 21 Md.
App. 666, 671, 321 A.2d 170, 174 (1974) (also upholding the trial judge's refusal to allow
withdrawal of the plea, and explaining that "it would be a manifest injustice to allow the
withdrawal of a plea of insanity in the face of [uncontradicted, competent] evidence [that the
accused was insane] .... "); List v. State, 18 Md. App. 578, 585-87, 308 A.2d 451, 455-56
(1973), vacated on other grounds, 271 Md. 367, 316 A.2d 824 (1974) (holding that defense
counsel had authority to enter an insanity plea as a matter of trial strategy, irrespective of the
defendant's objections, and upholding trial judge's refusal to allow withdrawal of plea); State v.
Pautz, 299 Minn. 113, 117, 217 N.W.2d 190, 192 (1974) (recognizing in dicta the right of the
trial judge to raise the defense and implying that mandatory commitment of the defendant
after the trial judge raised the insanity defense would not violate due process), but see Lynch v.
Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719-20 (1962) (discussed supra at note 23 and accompanying text,
holding that the District of Columbia's mandatory commitment statute could not apply when
the defendant had not raised the defense); State v. Hermann, 283 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. 1955)
(explaining in dicta that evidence of the defendant's insanity is admissible irrespective of the
defendant's wishes "if his friends or counsel set up this defense"); State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295,
307-08, 125 N.W.2d 918, 926 (1964) (upholding the trial judge's instruction to the jury regard-
ing the legal test of insanity after the defendant, who had not specifically invoked the defense,
proffered evidence of his low intelligence); State v. Khan, 175 N.J. Super. 72, 83, 417 A.2d 585,
592 (1980) (also recognizing the right of the trial judge to impose the defense); State v. Gad-
son, 148 N.J. Super. 457, 463, 372 A.2d 1143, 1144 (1973) (recognizing the trial judge's right
to impose the defense sua sponte).
Courts holding or suggesting that imposition of the defense by the trial judge is improper
include the following: United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1164 (5th Cir. 1974) (recog-
nizing defense counsel's authority to shun the defense on the basis of trial strategy); State v.
Johnson, 116 Ariz. 561, 563, 570 P.2d 503, 505 (1977) (holding that the defendant is presumed
sane and must introduce evidence raising doubts about his sanity before it becomes an issue for
the trial judge to resolve); People v. Gauze, 15 Cal. 3d 709, 717-18, 542 P.2d 1365, 1370 (1975)
(holding that the trial judge could not, sua sponte, compel the insanity defense), but see People
v. Merkouris, 46 Cal. 2d 540, 553, 297 P.2d 999, 1008-09 (1956) (holding that the trial judge
abused discretion by allowing the defendant to withdraw his insanity plea. The court in Gauze
distinguished Merkouris on the ground there was doubt in Merkouris about the defendant's
competency to withdraw his plea.); People v. Redmond, 16 Cal. App. 3d 931, 938-39, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 543, 548 (1971) (holding that the trial judge erred by refusing to permit withdrawal of an
insanity plea after the defendant was found guilty, so long as the defendant's choice was free
and voluntary and based on adequate comprehension of the consequences); Hooks v. State, 266
Ind. 678, 682, 366 N.E.2d 645, 647 (1977) (recognizing that the insanity defense can be
waived); White v. State, 17 Md. App. 58, 61-64, 299 A.2d 873, 874-76 (1973) (holding that
withdrawal of the insanity defense is a matter of trial strategy not subject to review by the
court); Anderson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Mo. App. 1973) (recognizing that the right to
plead the insanity defense is "personal to the accused" and can be waived); People v. Gonzales,
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sanity, but he may not, in a proper case, prevent the court from
injecting it....
One of the major foundations for the structure of the criminal
law is the concept of responsibility, and the law is clear that one
whose acts would otherwise be criminal has committed no crime at
all if because of incapacity due to ... mental condition he is not
responsible for those acts....
[T]he trial judge must uphold this structural foundation by
refusing to allow the conviction of an obviously mentally irrespon-
sible defendant, and when there is sufficient question as to a de-
fendant's mental responsibility at the time of the crime, this issue
must become part of the case.3 2
Specifically, the court in Whalem held that the particular trial judge
had not abused his discretion by refusing to raise the defense.33 This
holding presents several problems.34 First, the court did not address rea-
sons why the defendant might wish to oppose the defense; presumably, it
recognized none as persuasive. Second, the court did not adopt stan-
dards for trial judges to follow in determining whether there is "sufficient
question" about the defendant's "mental responsibility;"35 the court
merely noted that "the question must be resolved on a case by case ba-
20 N.Y.2d 289, 294-95, 229 N.E.2d 220, 223, 282 N.Y.S.2d 538, 542-43 (1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 971 (1968) (upholding the trial judge's failure to raise the insanity defense sua sponte
when the defendant appearedpro se and did not raise the defense); People v. Baxter, 32 A.D.2d
840, 840-41, 302 N.Y.S.2d 456, 457 (1969) (holding that defense counsel's failure to interject
the defense was not ineffective assistance of counsel because it was a proper matter of trial
strategy, and that the trial judge did not err by refusing to override counsel's decision); State v.
Jones, 99 Wash. 2d 735, 737, 744, 664 P.2d 1216, 1217, 1221 (1983) (as long as the defendant
is competent to stand trial, "a court may rarely, if ever, [enter a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity] but . . . does have a duty to assure the defendant's waiver of an [insanity] plea is
voluntary); State v. Johnston, 84 Wash. 2d 572, 577-78, 527 P.2d 1310, 1313 (1974) (holding
that the trial judge did not abuse discretion by permitting the defendant to waive the defense);
State v. Dodd, 70 Wash. 2d 513, 519-20, 424 P.2d 302, 306 (1967) (recognizing that the deci-
sion to plead insanity belongs to the defendant, not to his attorney); Mendenhall v. Hopper,
453 F. Supp. 977, 983 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (holding that a trial judge has no affirmative duty to
impose the defense even when the evidence presents a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's
responsibility for the crime); United States ex reL Laudati v. Ternullo, 423 F. Supp. 1210, 1217
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding it is not improper, under New York law, for the trial judge to defer
to the wishes of a competent, adequately represented defendant who chooses to forego the
defense. The court also announced its belief that the rules regarding the insanity defense were
matters of state law only, and do not raise issues of constitutional magnitude.).
32. Whalem, 346 F.2d at 818.
33. Id. at 819.
34. A tangential problem with the language quoted above from Whalem is that the court
seems to confuse the mens rea doctrine with the insanity defense. An "insane" defendant may
well have committed the crime (having both actus reus and mens rea), but simply is held not
responsible by virtue of his mental illness. See discussion infra notes 75-76 and accompanying
text.
35. Id. at 818-19.
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sis." 36 Most important, however, by stating that the trial judge "must
... refus[e] to allow the conviction of an obviously mentally irresponsible
defendant," the court effectively characterized society's interest in pro-
tecting those who are morally blameless as superior to the interest of the
defendant in selecting his own defense.3 7
Later, in United States v. Robertson,3 8 decided in the same jurisdic-
tion, the court set forth various factors the trial judge might consider in
deciding whether to impose the defense: (1) the bizarre nature of the
crime; (2) whether defense counsel wishes to raise the defense; (3) the
differing views of experts on the question of insanity; and (4) the defend-
ant's behavior at trial. 39 Robertson did not substantially alter the Whalem
approach, however, even though the court identified factors that may
influence a trial judge's exercise of discretion, because the court also
stated that the defendant's decision could not be controlling.'
2. The Frendak View
In sharp contrast to Whalem, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
36. Id. at 819 n.10.
37. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
It should be noted, however, that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit (the Whalem court) has consistently upheld the discretion of trial judges,
whether exercised to interpose the defense or not. It is particularly enlightening to compare
United States v. Wright, 511 F.2d 1311, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Wright 1) and United States v.
Wright, 627 F.2d 1300, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wright I1). See infra note 58. The two cases
are unrelated except insofar as they both involve the same defendant, Beachey L. Wright, and
his destruction of government property on separate occasions. In Wright 1, the court upheld
the trial judge's imposition of the insanity defense; in Wright I1, the court upheld the trial
judge's discretion not to impose the defense. See also United States v. Ashe, 478 F.2d 661, 664
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding discretion to impose the defense); United States v. Simms, 463
F.2d 1273, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (upholding discretion not to impose the defense); Cross v.
United States, 389 F.2d 957, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (same); and Trest v. United States, 350 F.2d
794, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1018 (1966) (same).
38. 507 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Robertson, the defendant, a black man, shot a
white man without any apparent provocation. After the shooting, the defendant ran down the
street brandishing a pistol and shouting "white sons of bitches." Id. at 1150. Immediately
after his arrest and at the preliminary hearing, he offered additional, incoherent racist com-
mentary. Id. at 1150-51. He refused to rely on the insanity defense against the advice of his
counsel, despite psychological evaluations which would have supported the defense. Id. at
1151. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
39. 507 F.2d at 1158.
40. Id. at 1160. The Whalem approach has been criticized even among the members of
the court. Chief Judge Bazelon, author of the court's opinion in Robertson, issued a separate
statement expressing doubts about the Vhalem approach and urging en banc reconsideration.
Id. at 1161. Judge Wilkey, dissenting in Robertson, suggested that the majority opinion might
violate due process and "the entire adversary concept of a criminal trial." Id. at 1165.
[Vol. 15:295
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peals held in Frendak v. United States41 that "the trial judge may not
force an insanity defense on a defendant found competent to stand trial if
the individual intelligently and voluntarily decides to forego that de-
fense."'42 The court further held that the trial judge's "finding of compe-
tency to stand trial is not, in itself, sufficient to show that the defendant is
capable of rejecting an insanity defense; the trial judge must make further
inquiry into whether the defendant has made an intelligent and voluntary
decision.""
The Frendak court's "intelligent and voluntary decision" limitation
is wise. It requires the trial judge to conduct further inquiry after the
defendant has been deemed "competent." Because the findings required
to support a determination of competence are minimal,' a finding of
competence alone does not resolve the issue of whether a defendant's
waiver of the insanity defense is voluntary and intelligent.
45
The further inquiry, however, should not be interpreted to permit
substitution of the trial judge's judgment for the defendant's. Substitu-
tion would merely duplicate the Whalem approach while paying lip ser-
vice to the defendant's automony. Rather, the inquiry should simply
assess the validity of the defendant's waiver. It should be the same type
of inquiry used to assess the validity of any criminal defendant's waiver
of any constitutional right. The waiver must be "voluntary" in the sense
that it must be free from duress or coercion, 46 and it must be "intelli-
gent" in the sense that it must be rational, but not that it must be wise.47
41. 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979). In Frendak, the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder and of carrying a pistol without a license. Id. at 366. The trial judge, troubled by
evidence introduced at the competency hearing, decided to impose the insanity defense over
the defendant's objection. The jury then found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity.
Id. at 366-67.
42. Id. at 367 (emphasis in original). The court remanded in order for the trial judge to
determine whether the defendant had made an intelligent and voluntary decision. Id. at 381.
43. Id.
44. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
45. This separate inquiry is analogous to the separate inquiry used by some courts to
determine whether a competent defendant is also competent to plead guilty. See infra notes 47
& 70 and accompanying text.
46. Regarding the voluntariness of a confession, see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 602 (1961), in which the Court stated:
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by
its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not,
if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically im-
paired, the use of his confession offends due process.
See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1973) (regarding the volunta-
riness of consent to a search); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749-55 (1970) (regarding
the voluntariness of a guilty plea).
47. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938), the Court explained: "The determina-
tion of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in
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In reaching its holding, the court in Frendak relied upon two United
States Supreme Court decisions. In North Carolina v. Alford,48 a defend-
ant who was charged with first degree murder claimed complete inno-
cence, but nevertheless pleaded guilty to second degree murder.49 The
Court held that the trial judge did not violate the defendant's due process
rights by accepting the guilty plea."0 The Court emphasized that the de-
fendant may have had legitimate reasons for pleading guilty, such as
avoiding the risk of greater punishment.5 " The Court also observed in
dicta, however, that a defendant does not have an absolute constitutional
right to have his guilty plea accepted.5 2
The court in Frendak also relied on Faretta v. California,3 in which
the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees "the right
to self representation-to make one's own defense personally... ."" The
each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Similarly, in Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970), discussed supra note 46, the Court concluded that the defendant
"intelligently made" a guilty plea because he "was advised by counsel, he was made aware of
the nature of the charge against him, and there was nothing to indicate that he was incompe-
tent or otherwise not in control of his faculties ..... Arguably, these Supreme Court opinions
indicate trial judges should inquire deeply into the "intelligence" of a defendant's waiver, ex-
tending the inquiry beyond that of mere "competence." Indeed, some courts have held that
the competencey standard does not adequately measure the ability of a defendant to make a
voluntary and intelligent waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d. 721, 726 n.30
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (the awareness and necessity to waive constitutional rights differs from that
necessary to stand trial); Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214-15 (9th Cir. 1973) (a pretrial
determination of competency is an inadequate measure of competency to plead guilty).
On the other hand, other courts have held that the competency standard and the waiver
standard are identical. See, e.g., United States ex rel. McGough v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339, 342
n.2 (3d Cir. 1975) (specifically criticizing Sieling); Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649,
654 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the standards are the same). None of these opinions, how-
ever, focus on the wisdom of the defendant's choice, but only on the defendant's ability to make
that choice.
48. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
49. Id. at 27. Alford's attorney recommended the guilty plea in light of strong evidence of
Alford's guilt. Before accepting the plea, however, the trial judge required a summary presen-
tation of the prosecution's case. Alford then took the stand and testified that he did not com-
mit the murder but was pleading guilty to avoid the possibility of the death penalty. Id. at 27-
28.
50. Id. at 38.
51. Id. at 37.
52. Id. at 38 n. 11. This statement was merely dictum because the only question before the
Court was whether the trial judge's acceptance of the guilty plea violated due process, not
whether a refusal to accept the plea would violate due process.
53. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
54. Id. at 819. Faretta was charged with grand theft. He requested permission to repre-
sent himself because he believed the public defender's office was overburdened. Id. at 807.
Before trial, the judge "quizzed" Faretta on various legal points such as the rule against hear-
say. Unimpressed with Faretta's performance, the judge denied the request, ruling that
Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to the assistance of coun-
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decision in Faretta, unlike Alford, rested on constitutional principles.
Nonetheless, the court in Frendak emphasized that "Aliford and Faretta
both stressed the importance of permitting a defendant to make decisions
central to the defense-a concern given little if any significance in
Whalem." 55
Interestingly, in United States v. Robertson,56 decided two years
before Frendak, the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia (the trial court in the Whalem jurisdiction) purported to follow
W1halem, but also noted the relevance of Alford and Faretta:
The Court's decision to honor defendant's opposition to impo-
sition of an insanity defense is supported by the language and im-
plication of Faretta v. California and North Carolina v. Alford. Just
as a defendant may elect to forego representation by counsel and
just as a defendant may enter a plea of guilty for reasons other than
his guilt, so too should a defendant who is competent and whose
decision is made rationally and with awareness of its consequences
be allowed to proceed to trial without introduction of the insanity
defense, even though there may be evidence in the case which
could support such a defense. 7
This language is remarkably similar to that used in Frendak. Ap-
parently, the essential difference between Robertson and Frendak is that
the court in Robertson interpreted Alford and Faretta to require the trial
judge to consider the defendant's autonomy as but one factor influencing
the judge's discretion; the court in Frendak, however, interpreted Alford
and Faretta as eliminating the trial judge's discretion altogether.
3. The Response to Frendak-Wright's Reaffirmation of Whalem
After Frendak, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit (the Whalem jurisdiction) reconsidered the issue
and reaffirmed the Whalem approach in United States v. Wright.5s First,
sel and that he bad no constitutional right to represent himself. Id. at 808-10. Faretta was
convicted as charged. Id. at 811.
55. Frendak, 408 A.2d at 375 (emphasis added). In contrast to the conclusions of this
Article, the court in Frendak found that "[n]either case [Alford nor Faretta] renders the
Whalem rule unconstitutional." Id. The court justified this conclusion on the ground that
Alford recognized that a defendant does not have an absolute right to have his guilty plea
accepted, and Faretta was "limited to recognizing a sixth amendment right to appearpro se."
Id. at 376. However, as discussed infra notes 109-114 and accompanying text, this Article
concludes that Faretta should not be construed so narrowly. Faretta's reasoning and signifi-
cance are far broader than its precise holding.
56. 430 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1977). This case was heard on remand from the United
States Court of Appeals, United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
57. 430 F. Supp. at 447 n.4 (citations omitted).
58. 627 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Wright, the defendant destroyed a replica of the
United States Capitol Building which was on public display. He claimed he "was 'inspired' by
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the court dismissed the relevance of Alford and Faretta as "de minimus"
because neither case involved an insanity defense.5 9 Second, the court
asserted that the Whalem approach acknowledges and respects the de-
fendant's wishes even though the trial judge could not "abdicate to the
defendant the judicial duty to explore the issue once sufficient questions
are raised."6 Third, the court criticized Frendak's "voluntary and intel-
ligent decision" requirement as duplicative of the inquiry under Whalem:
In a real sense, a defendant lacking mental responsibility can-
not "voluntarily" waive the insanity defense. The "voluntariness"
portion ... thus inevitably turns to the strength of the possible
insanity defense-and raises the matters covered in a Whalem
inquiry....
Similarly, the proposed "intelligence" criterion introduces
Whalem concerns because "intelligence" must involve more than
evidence that a reasonable defendant would decline the defense.
The stigma and risk of confinement associated with a successful
insanity defense provide grounds for always finding opposition to
the defense "intelligent" . .. Thus the "intelligence" of the de-
fendant's choice can be determined only by an inquiry into the
merits of his choice-precisely the Whalem examination.61
But the court's dismissal of Frendak in Wright is ill-considered.
First, even though neither Alford nor Faretta involved an insanity issue,
both decisions were based upon the fundamental interest in personal free-
dom; the importance of this interest does not diminish merely because an
insanity issue has arisen. Indeed, to dismiss the relevance of Alford and
Faretta as de minimus blatantly discriminates against the mentally ill.
Second, the court's supposed deference to the defendant's wishes is
hollow: if the trial judge only defers when she agrees with the defendant,
her "deference" is void of all real meaning. Third, the court's analysis of
the "intelligent and voluntary decision" criteria of Frendak is specious.
The Frendak approach does not duplicate the Whalem approach because
the two inquiries focus on the defendant's condition at different times.
Whether the defendant's decision to forego the defense is "voluntary"
depends exclusively on his mental condition at the time of trial. The
strength of the insanity defense, however, depends exclusively on the de-
the Holy Spirit to commit a symbolic act, intended to warn people of God's impending judg-
ment that the nation 'has deviated from his original designs.'" Id. at 1302. The defendant
refused to rely on the insanity defense despite supportive psychiatric evaluations, believing it
would compromise his religious beliefs. Id. at 1303-05. See supra note 37 for a discussion of
Mr. Wright's involvement in a similar episode several years earlier.
59. 627 F.2d at 1310.
60. Id. at 1310-11.
61. Id. at 1311-12 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
fendant's mental condition at the time of the alleged offense.62 Further-
more, the Frendak inquiry into "intelligence" should not involve a trial
judge's determination of whether the defendant's decision is wise; rather,
the inquiry should address only whether the decision is rational.6 3
B. Societal Interests and the Whalem View
L Protecting the Morally Blameless
The primary justification advanced for the Whalem view is society's
interest in protecting morally blameless individuals from criminal pun-
ishment."4 Although this justification has superficial appeal, it is flawed
in two fundamental respects. It assumes that the defendant's ability to
raise the insanity defense himself is somehow insufficient protection
against the danger of wrongful conviction, and it assumes a hospitalized
insanity acquittee is not being "punished." As explained below, both as-
sumptions are erroneous. First, a finding that the defendant is "compe-
tent" to stand trial assures he is sufficiently cognizant of the proceedings
to invoke the defense if he wishes. Second, involuntary commitment to a
psychiatric hospital is surely "punishment" because it goes against the
defendant's wishes and has immense stigma attached.
a. The Danger of Wrongful Conviction
By the time the insanity issue arises, the trial judge typically has
already held the defendant competent to stand trial. Of course, the in-
sanity issue may not have been raised at all, in which case the trial will
usually proceed on an unspoken assumption of competency.65 However,
in Pate v. Robinson,66 the Supreme Court held that when a defendant
fails to raise the incompetency issue, the trial judge must raise it sua
sponte if "the evidence raises a 'bona fide doubt' as to a defendant's com-
62. See Comment, The Right and Responsibility of a Court to Impose the Insanity Defense
Over the Defendant's Objection, 65 MINN. L. REv. 927, 936-37 (1981).
63. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
64. Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 862 (1965).
65. In all jurisdictions, a defendant is deemed incompetent to stand trial if mental illness
renders him incapable of understanding the proceedings or assisting in his defense. Winick,
supra note 3, at 923. The Supreme Court has held that a defendant is competent if "he has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing... and... has a rational as well as factual undirstanding of the proceedings against
him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Most states have codified the Dusky
formulation of competency. See S. BRAKEL, supra note 2, at 695. Furthermore, conviction of
a legally incompetent defendant violates due process. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1974);
Porter v. Estelle, 709 F.2d 944, 949 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Voice, 627 F.2d 138 (8th
Cir. 1980).
66. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
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petence to stand trial. .. .,67 The rationale behind the Pate rule is obvi-
ous. If a defendant is indeed incompetent-if he has no rational or
factual understanding of the proceedings 68-clearly he cannot be ex-
pected to raise that very issue. The trial judge must raise it for him.
The Pate rule, however, has no bearing on the insanity defense. The
question of insanity, in contrast to the question of competence, relates to
the defendant's condition at the time of the alleged crime, not to his
condition at the time of trial. A defendant who has been deemed compe-
tent to stand trial may have serious psychological problems, but by defi-
nition he has a "rational understanding" of the proceedings and is
capable of assisting in his own defense.69
A defendant may be competent for some purposes, but not for
others. For example, the Supreme Court has held that a defendant,
although competent to stand trial, may still be incompetent to conduct
his own defense.70 This distinction is sensible. A marginally competent
defendant cannot be expected to master the intricacies of trial procedure.
But the complexities involved in actually trying a case differ greatly from
making basic strategic decisions such as choosing a plea. Although the
competency standard is not rigorous, it does require the defendant to
have a fundamental appreciation of the general purpose and possible out-
comes of the trial, sufficient to enable him to make broad strategic deci-
sions about his defense.
The competency requirement stems from society's sense that it is
simply wrong to subject an uncomprehending defendant to the rigors of
criminal accusations and proceedings. But a competent criminal defend-
ant by definition comprehends both the accusations and the proceed-
ings.71 Therefore, his ability to raise the insanity issue if he chooses is
sufficient protection against wrongful conviction.
67. Id. at 385.
68. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
69. Id. See supra note 65.
70. Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966). See also Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105,
108 (1954) ("[O]ne might not be insane in the sense of being incapable of standing trial and yet
lack the capacity to stand trial without benefit of counsel.").
Courts are divided on whether a finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial neces-
sarily means that he is also competent to enter a guilty plea. In Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d
211, 214 (9th Cir. 1973), the court held that a separate competency hearing is required to
determine competency to plead guilty when "the question of a defendant's lack of mental
capacity lurks in the background." See also United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
Other courts have rejected this dual inquiry and have held that the degree of competence
necessary to plead guilty is the same as that necessary to stand trial. See, e.g., Allard v.
Helgemoe, 572 F.2d 1, 3 (Ist Cir. 1978).
71. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. See supra note 65; see also Winick, supra note 3, at 923.
[Vol. 15:295
INSANITY DEFENSE
b. Punishment by Hospitalization
The insanity acquittee usually is subject to mandatory hospitaliza-
tion.72 This is true even if the particular jurisdiction requires a regular
civil commitment proceeding prior to commitment.73 But a defendant
may find incarceration in a hospital more objectionable than incarcera-
tion in prison. As the court in Frendak observed: "[T]he defendant may
object to the quality of treatment or the type of confinement to which he
or she may be subject in an institution for the mentally ill. If in need of
psychiatric care, the individual may prefer the prospect of receiving
whatever treatment is available in the prison."'74 Therefore, the insanity
acquittee is clearly being "punished" from his own perspective.
He is also being punished from society's perspective. Although the
law distinguishes an insanity acquittee from an adjudicated felon or mis-
demeanant, the insanity acquittee is nonetheless found to have commit-
ted the actus reus," and, generally, as having had the requisite mens
rea.76 The insanity defense alone does not contest the presence of the
72. See S. BRAKEL, supra note 2, at 725; S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORREC-
TION 581 (2d ed. 1973).
73. S. BRAKEL, supra note 2, at 725. In the past, long term, perhaps even permanent,
confinement typically followed an adjudication of "not guilty by reason of insanity." In recent
years some liberalization has occured due to the availabilty of psychotropic medication. Id.
Although the laws relating to the disposition of insanity defense acquittees are still in transi-
tion, the unfavorable public response to the proposed unsupervised Easter Holiday for John
Hinckley in 1987 demonstrates a general reluctance by society to allow an early release of
these individuals. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1987, at A-18, col. 3. Joseph E. diGenova, a
United States Attorney in Washington D.C., when asked on the C.B.S. Network's television
program, "Face the Nation," whether John Hinckley should ever be released, said, "I doubt it
sincerely." Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1987, at A-5, col. 1.
74. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 376 (D.C. 1979).
75. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (5th ed. 1979) defines "actus reus" as "[a] wrongful
deed which renders the actor criminally liable if combined with mens rea; a guilty mind." See
State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 246, 344 A.2d 289, 295 (1975) ("[An insanity verdict] implies a
finding that [the] defendant has committed the actus reus .. ").
76. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 75, at 889, defines "mens rea" as "[a] guilty
mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent."
Theoretically, the absence of mens rea should lead to a finding that no "crime" was even
committed, and the defendant should be acquitted on that basis alone, separate and apart from
his insanity defense. Some courts, however, seem to confuse the concepts of mens rea (crimi-
nal intent) and insanity (criminal responsibility). See, e.g., State v. Krol, 68 N.J. at 246, 344
A.2d at 295 (citing State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 401, 316 A.2d 449, 459 (1974)) (although a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity "implies a finding that defendant has committed the
actus reus, it also constitutes a finding that he did so without a criminal state of mind. There is,
in effect, no crime to punish." (emphasis added)); see also State v. Stern, 40 N.J. Super. 291,
296, 123 A.2d 43, 45 (App. Div. 1956) ("[I]f the defendant was insane when the alleged crimes
were committed, he is just as innocent legally as if they were perpetrated by some other per-
son." (emphasis added)). This notion is questionable, however, as demonstrated by those juris-
dictions that have abandoned the insanity defense entirely, while retaining the mens rea
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actus reus and mens rea; instead it is typically raised as an atfrmative
defense or by special plea.77 In jurisdictions permitting dual pleas of
"not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity," the prosecution has
actually proved its case-in-chief before the insanity defense even comes
into play.78 In other jurisdictions, the defendant essentially admits the
crime (actus reus and mens rea).79 Nowhere is the insanity acquittee
truly freed from moral blame. He is viewed as having committed the
crime and as being insane; he is "twice cursed."80 The hospitalized in-
sanity acquittee is thus "punished" in two real ways: first, he is incarcer-
ated under circumstances he may find more objectionable than prison;
second, society still views him as having committed the crime, but as
having "gotten off."8"
doctrine. See infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text; see also supra note 34, criticizing
Whalem's similar confusion of these concepts.
77. R. REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM-CIVIL AND CRIMINAL As-
PECTS 668 (1985); S. BRAKEL, supra note 2, Table 12.5, at 769-73. In some jurisdictions the
defense is raised by providing written notice. Id.
78. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016 (West 1985); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 552
(West 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 40(1) (Supp. 1986); see also supra note 6.
79. S. BRAKEL, supra note 2, at 719. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
80. Frendak, 408 A.2d 364, 377 (D.C. 1979) (quoting United States ex rel. Schuster v.
Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1073 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969), in turn quoting
Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis of the Confinement of Mentally
Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correction of the State of New York, 17
BUFFALO L. REv. 651, 651-52 (1968), relying upon an earlier commentator). See W. SHAKE-
SPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act IV, § 1, lines 182-185:
The quality of mercy is not strain'd;
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.
(emphasis added); see also Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607, 610-11 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cerL
denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
81. The public view that an insanity acquittee has "gotten off" is demonstrated by the fact
that, following John Hinckley's acquittal by reason of insanity for the attempted assassination
of President Reagan in 1981, twenty-seven bills were introduced in Congress to abolish or
redefine the insanity defense. S. BRAKEL, supra note 2, at 707 n.186.
The insanity defense also may be used to "punish" a particularly reprehensible defendant
who stands accused of only a minor crime. The trial judge or the prosecutor may wish to
ensure that he will be incarcerated for as long as possible. See Eizenstat, Mental Competency
to Stand Trial, 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L, REV. 379, 384 (1968); Singer, Insanity Acquittal in the
Seventies: Observation and Empirical Analysis of One Jurisdiction, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 406, 413-16 (1978); S. RUBIN, supra note 7, at 37-39. Furthermore, when presented with
only two choices- conviction or acquittal-a jury with some suspicion that a defendant is
guilty, but also with some residual "reasonable doubt," will likely follow its mandate to choose
acquittal. But a jury with a third choice-not guilty by reason of insanity-may ignore its
mandate and select the compromise. See Comment, supra note 62, at 945 & n.97, analogizing
the "compromise" insanity verdict to a jury's guilty verdict on a lesser included offense in lieu
of the more serious offense.
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2. Legislative Abandonment of the Insanity Defense
Several jurisdictions have recently abandoned the insanity defense
entirely.82 In these jurisdictions, the mens rea doctrine prevents convic-
tion of a truly mentally irresponsible defendant. 83 If the prosecution fails
to prove the requisite mental state for a given offense, it fails to prove an
essential element of the crime and the defendant is acquitted of that
charge,84 irrespective of whether he raises any defense.85
In State v. Korell,86 the Montana Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of a statute abolishing the defense. 87 Other recent attempts to
abolish the defense have not been challenged. The United States Supreme
Court has not ruled on whether the Constitution requires the availability
of an insanity defense.
Three state supreme courts, however, have held prior legislative at-
tempts to abolish the defense unconstitutional. In State v. Strasburg,88
the Supreme Court of Washington struck down a statute on the ground
that it relieved the prosecution of having to prove intent. The Supreme
Court of Mississippi reached a similar result in Sinclair v. State.89 And
in State v. Lange,90 the Supreme Court of Louisiana struck down a stat-
ute that bifurcated the guilt and insanity stages of trial and provided for a
"lunacy commission" to make the final determination of a defendant's
sanity.
At least two commentators have argued that these early decisions
indicate the current attempts to abolish the insanity defense will also be
held unconstitutional.9 However, the current statutes do not abandon
the concept of mental responsibility entirely, but substitute the mens rea
82. See IDAHO CODE § 18-207a (1986) ("Mental condition shall not be a defense to any
charge of criminal conduct."); see also MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-102 to 46-14-103 (1985);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (1986). In Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264, 465 A.2d 475
(1983), the Supreme Court of Maryland, by judicial fiat, effectively abolished the insanity
defense.
83. The Utah statute specifically preserves the mens rea doctrine with the following: "It is
a defense to a prosecution ... that the defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the
mental state required as an element of the offense charged. Mental illness is not otherwise a
defense." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1986). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102
(1985).
84. Of course, the defendant may nevertheless be convicted of a different crime that re-
quires a different mental state.
85. See R. REISNER, supra note 77, at 668.
86. 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984).
87. Id. at 1002.
88. 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
89. 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) (per curiam).
90. 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929) (en bane).
91. Robitscher & Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 EMORY L.J. 9, 56 (1982).
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requirement. The statutes do not violate due process because the prose-
cution must still prove the requisite mental state as a substantive element
of the crime, and the defense may introduce psychiatric evidence to rebut
the prosecution's case.92
If legislative or judicial abrogation of the insanity defense does not
violate due process, a trial judge's failure to interpose it sua sponte can-
not. But even if the United States Supreme Court ultimately determines
the insanity defense must be available, this still does not mean a trial
judge must impose it on an unwilling defendant. The defendant still
could waive his constitutional right to assert an insanity defense just as
he may now waive his constitutional right against self incrimination93 or
his constitutional right to a jury trial.94
C. Individual Interests and the Frendak View
1. Pragmatic Reasons for Avoiding the Insanity Defense
The Frendak decision rested on the "underlying philosophy of Al-
ford and Faretta."95 As the court observed in Frendak:
Whalem ... laid substantially more emphasis on the strength
of the evidence supporting an insanity defense than on the defend-
ant's choice. In contrast, Alford and Faretta reason that respect
for a defendant's freedom as a person mandates that he or she be
permitted to make fundamental decisions about the course of the
proceedings.96
The court found this reasoning persuasive and offered the following
"reasons why defendants convicted of an offense may choose to accept
the jury's verdict rather than raise a potentially successful insanity de-
fense:" 97 (1) possibly longer confinement; (2) quality of treatment in a
mental hospital; (3) stigma of insanity; (4) irrational fear of the mentally
ill; (5) risk of future discrimination; (6) restriction of legal rights; (7)
denigration of a political or religious protest; and (8) perception that an
insanity defense is equivalent to an admission of guilt.98
But the court in Frendak ignored the fact that trial procedure in the
Whalem jurisdiction eliminates many of these potential evils. First, the
92. See generally R. RIiSNER, supra note 77, at 685-90.
93. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
94. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
95. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 376 (D.C. 1979).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 376-78.
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guilt and insanity stages of trial are bifurcated.99 Bifurcation affords the
defendant full and fair opportunity to contest his guilt and receive com-
plete acquittal. Second, under Lynch v. Overholser,°° a defendant who
does not raise the insanity defense cannot be subjected to mandatory
commitment; he can only be hospitalized pursuant to the standard civil
commitment process.' He is thus afforded the full panoply of proce-
dural protections afforded to any civil committee, thereby obviating any
equal protection concerns. 10 2
2. The Fundamental Constitutional Right to Choose One's Own Defense
to Criminal Prosecutions
Despite the procedural protections afforded by the Whalem ap-
proach, the Frendak approach is still preferable, and, indeed, may be
constitutionally required. The Constitution does not explicitly guarantee
the right to select personally one's available defenses to criminal prosecu-
tion. However, the imposition of an unwanted defense contravenes the
very nature of our criminal justice system. Even if the wresting of con-
trol from an accused does not violate due process per se,'0 3 it violates our
basic notion of a fair trial. The enumerated rights of trial by jury, con-
frontation of witnesses, assistance of counsel, and the right against self-
incrimination, as well as the vaguer notion of due process, are all simply
accoutrements to the basic Anglo-American concept of a fair trial as it
has developed over the centuries. The right to select personally one's de-
fenses, though not an enumerated right, is central to this idea of a fair
trial. Indeed, it is inherent in our constitutional framework of criminal
jurisprudence.
Certainly, a primary objective in any criminal trial is to ascertain the
truth-the guilt or innocence of the accused. But the search for truth,
though primary, does not subordinate all other interests. The Constitu-
tion precludes several extremely effective truth-finding vehicles. For ex-
99. See United States v. Robertson, 430 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1977); Frendak, 408 A.2d
at 366-67.
100. 369 U.S. 705 (1962). See supra notes 27-28.
101. 369 U.S. at 708.
102. The Whalem approach does not address, however, a defendant's wish to announce his
crime as a political statement; nevertheless, if the conduct has been designated illegal because it
violates public policy, this interest should never be recognized as legitimate. For a contrary
view, however, see Resnick, The Political Offender: Forensic Psychiatric Considerations, 6
BULL OF AM. ACAD. OF PSYCH. & L. 388 (1978).
103. One court, however, has held that forcing any unwanted defense on a criminal defend-
ant violates due process. Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1961).
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ample, the fourth amendment search and seizure restrictions1" and the
fifth amendment self-incrimination restrictions 0 5 clearly inhibit the im-
mediate truth-seeking function of the trial by suppressing illegally ob-
tained evidence, but they further more fundamental goals. These
constitutional restrictions, of course, are protections. Even if they con-
ceal truth, they cannot backfire upon the accused; 10 6 they may prevent
conviction of a guilty defendant, but they will not cause conviction of an
innocent defendant.10 7
Punishment of an innocent defendant is also contrary to our concept
of criminal justice. The failure of a trial judge to impose an insanity
defense, unlike the fourth and fifth amendment protections, conceivably
could result in the conviction of an "innocent" defendant-one who has
committed the crime, but who is ostensibly morally blameless. But even
though the defendant may thus avoid conviction, he does not avoid pun-
ishment. He is typically incarcerated in a hospital and is always stigma-
tized, both by the mark of insanity and by the mark of criminality.108
Therefore, the larger interest in an individual's autonomy and freedom of
choice must take precedence over the purported interest in refusing to
punish the mentally ill.
In Faretta v. California,"0 9 the Supreme Court held that the sixth
amendment right to the assistance of counsel also guarantees "the right
to self-representation-to make one's own defense personally . . . .
The Sixth Amendment does not explicitly provide for this guarantee.
Rather, "when naturally read," the Amendment "implies a right of self-
representation." ' 1 As the Court observed in Faretta, "[a]n unwanted
counsel represents the defendant only through a tenuous and unaccept-
104. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding the exclusionary rule applies to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment).
105. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
106. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that the prosecutor cannot
comment upon the defendant's refusal to take the witness stand); see also Carter v. Kentucky,
450 U.S. 333 (1987) (requiring the trial court to instruct the jury, upon request by a defendant
who has declined to testify, that it must disregard the defendant's silence).
107. As a practical matter, a jury is free to speculate about a defendant's failure to testify
on his own behalf despite the trial judge's instruction to the contrary. See Lakeside v. Oregon,
435 U.S. 333 (1978) (holding that the court's instruction to the jury not to make inferences
concerning the defendant's silence is permissible even when given over the defendant's
objection).
108. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
109. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
110. Id. at 819.
111. Id. at 821.
able legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representa-
tion, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the
Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense." '112
This language applies even more forcibly to the right to choose one's
own defenses. Contrary to the Frendak court's conclusion that Faretta
was "limited to recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to appear pro
se," 1 13 it is clear that Faretta should not be so limited; its reasoning is
much broader than its precise holding. "Unwanted counsel" may or may
not pursue unflaggingly the defenses chosen by the defendant. Yet
Faretta holds that imposition of unwanted counsel necessarily means that
the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed by the Constitution
because "it is not his [the defendant's] defense." I 4 A" fortiori, then, impo-
sition of the unwanted defense itself, as opposed to imposition of its mere
advocate, is not the defense guaranteed by the Constitution, because,
even more surely, "it is not his defense." Indeed, the defendant has spe-
cifically rejected it.
Although the right to select personally one's defenses to criminal
prosecution is not specifically protected by any single, enumerated con-
stitutional guarantees such as the sixth amendment right to counsel as
interpreted in Faretta, it is nevertheless a fundamental right, implied in
the schema of the Bill of Rights.
The Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to recognize implied
fundamental rights, despite their omission from the enumerated rights.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,"5 for example, the Court held that a statute
forbidding the use of contraceptives by married persons violated the right
of marital privacy."16 The Constitution does not superficially mention
this right, but seven members of the Court recognized it as a right wor-
thy of constitutional protection. 117 The seven justices, however, wrote
112. Id. (emphasis in original).
113. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 376 (D.C. 1979).
114. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821 (emphasis in original).
115. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For an in depth analysis of Griswold by various commentators of
the day, see Comments on the Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965).
116. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-86. In Griswold, a Connecticut statute prohibited the use of
contraceptive drugs and devices. The Executive Director and Medical Director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut were convicted under this statute for furnishing birth con-
trol information and instruction to married couples. Id. at 480. As a threshold matter, the
Court held that the defendants had standing to assert the constitutional rights of married
couples with whom they had a professional relationship. Id. at 481.
117. The right to use birth control has since been extended to single individuals as well as
married couples. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Indeed, it is clear that Griswold
applies far beyond the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms." See Justice Douglas' opinion
for the Court in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. The rationale of Griswold gradually has been
extended such "that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing
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four separate opinions and two dissenting justices each wrote an opinion,
all of which indicate the widely divergent views on the precise theoretical
underpinnings for the Court's decision.
Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for the Court,1"' in which he an-
nounced his belief "that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance."1 19 He found that "[v]arious guarantees create
zones of privacy,"'120 and that the right of marital privacy fell within one
of these privacy zones, a "penumbra" emanating from other specific con-
stitutional guarantees such as the freedom of expression and the right to
be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.121
Justice Goldberg, however, believed that the concept of "liberty,"
embodied in the Due Process Clause, "protects those personal rights that
are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of
Rights."'' 22 While he did not explicitly reject Justice Douglas's "penum-
bra" theory, Justice Goldberg chose to rely primarily on the Ninth
Amendment.1 23  He expressly disavowed, however, that the Ninth
Amendment could constitute "an independent source of rights protected
from infringement."124 Rather, he simply found it lent strong support to
his view that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause was not
restricted to those rights enumerated in the first eight amendments. 125
Justice Goldberg explained that a holding that the fundamental right of
marital privacy was not protected simply because it was not specifically
from unjustified intrusion by the State." Carey v. Population Svcs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687
(1977). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a criminal abortion law violated
the right to an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973) (holding that state-mandated medical procedures for
abortions violated the right to an abortion); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding that spousal and parental consent requirements for first
trimester abortions violated the right to an abortion).
118. Justice Douglas' opinion represented the views of a five-member majority. Joining
him in the Court's opinion were Justice Clark, who did not write separately, Justice Goldberg,
Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Brennan. Justice Goldberg, however, also wrote a concur-
ring opinion in which he set forth a different rationale for the decision. Nevertheless, the
concurring justices expressly joined in the Court's judgment and the opinion written by Justice
Douglas. 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 484.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 484-85.
122. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
123. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONsT. amend. IX.
124. 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
125. Id.
enumerated would render the Ninth Amendment meaningless. 126
Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment,' 27 stating that "the
proper constitutional inquiry is whether [the] statute infringes the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment vi-
olates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "128 Jus-
tice White also concurred, relying on the Due Process Clause.1 29
It seems that Justices Douglas, Goldberg, Harlan, and White based
their opinions on essentially the same concept, although each differed as
to its precise origin. They all maintained that certain rights are "funda-
mental" and worthy of constitutional protection even though they are
not specifically enumerated by the Constitution. 130
The analyses used by the various justices in Griswold can be com-
bined to recognize a right to choose personally one's defenses to criminal
prosecution. Although the right is not explicitly mentioned in the Con-
stitution, it too is a fundamental and inherent right worthy of constitu-
tional protection. It may be recognized via the "liberty" concept of the
Due Process Clause, buttressed by the Ninth Amendment and even by an
extrapolation from the more metaphysical notions of Justice Douglas-
the penumbral emanations from the sixth amendment's right to counsel
126. Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
129. Id. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
130. Justice Douglas believed in a penumbral zone of privacy created by "fundamental
constitutional guarantees." Id. at 485. Only Justice Goldberg specifically referred to "funda-
mental" rights as such. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Harlan referred to
"basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325). Justice White referred to "basic civil rights of man." Id. at
502 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
Perhaps Justice Douglas eschewed using the Due Process Clause as a theoretical under-
pinning because he feared the specter of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner
typified the heyday of economic substantive due process, later discredited by the Court in
decisions such as West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state mini-
mum wage standards) and United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (up-
holding federal regulation of milk products). In Griswold, Justice Douglas expressly declined
to let Lochner be his guide. 381 U.S. at 481. However, it is important to remember that the
Court never completely abandoned substantive due process in a non-economic context. Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (protecting the right to study German), and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (protecting the right of parents to send their children to private
schools), were never disapproved. Indeed, Justice Douglas relied on these cases in Griswold.
Similarly, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), the Court struck down a law
that essentially denied passports to members of the Communist Party. The Court held that the
right to travel abroad was a personal liberty implicit in the concept of due process. Therefore,
personal substantive due process rights are readily distinguishable from economic substantive
due process rights, and only the latter present any real difficulty for the Court.
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as interpreted in Faretta. But, however theorized, the right is implicit in
our concept of criminal justice as protected generally by the Bill of
Rights. To ignore the right merely because it is not explicitly protected
would be to ignore the spirit and purpose of the remaining express rights.
Conclusion
Although society has a legitimate interest in refusing to subject to
criminal punishment those whom it considers morally blameless by vir-
tue of their mental illness, that interest is not of constitutional dimension.
In contrast, a competent defendant has a substantial interest and funda-
mental right to conduct his defense as he deems most appropriate.
Though not explicit in the Bill of Rights, the right to choose one's man-
ner of defense is implicit in our Anglo-American concept of criminal jus-
tice. Accordingly, a trial judge should not substitute her judgment for the
judgment of a competent defendant on this basic trial decision unless the
defendant's competence is so marginal that his decisions cannot be con-
sidered voluntary and intelligent. The defendant has the ultimate right
to make those decisions, even if they are foolish or disastrous, and they
should not be forced upon him, even in his supposed best interest.
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